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PROPERTY
DAviD H. MEANS*
Con truction of Limitations
Four cases1 decided during the period under review raise
constructional questions which point up the difficulty of
drafting limitations free from ambiguity.
In Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Barlow,2 a testatrix bequeathed
the bulk of her considerable personal property in trust, to
be divided into fifteen equal shares which were to be con-
veyed "freed and discharged of all trusts" to designated
beneficiaries (children of her nieces and nephews) as each
attained the age of twenty-one, the income on a beneficiary's
share to be paid him or her until attainment of that age.
The will provided for payment at the death of the testatrix
of the shares of two beneficiaries who had attained twenty-
one during the testatrix's life, "as well as that given to any
other beneficiary . . .who shall have attained the age of
twenty-one (21) years at the time of my death .... " How-
ever, a further clause provided: "If any of the above-named
beneficiaries should predecease me, his or her share shall
be equally divided among the surviving beneficiaries; if any
child or children should be born at any time hereafter to
[designated persons whose then existing children were bene-
ficiaries of the trust], such child or children shall take a
share of the income and corpus equal to the share of each
of the other beneficiaries in the same manner as if said
child or children had been named therein." (emphasis sup-
plied)
After the testatrix's death, the executor and trustee sought
instruction as to whether the provision for later born bene-
ficiaries prevented any immediate distribution to those
beneficiaries already twenty-one years of age. The Record
disclosed (pp. 13, 14) that at the time of the suit the persons
who could be the parents of later born beneficiaries were a
man forty-six years of age, and two women aged forty-eight
and fifty-two years.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Croft v. McKie, 235 S. C. 231, 111 S. E. 2d 210 (1959); People's
Nat'l Bank v. Barlow, 235 S. C. 483, 112 S. E. 2d 396 (1960) ; Woodward
v. Cagle, 235 S. C. 527, 112 S. E. 2d 480 (1960); Gist v. Brown, 236 S. C.
31, 113 S. E. 2d 75 (1960).
2. See note 1 supra.
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Two problems confronted the Court. The first was wheth-
er or not a decree binding on children who might be born
after the testatrix's death could be rendered, since no such
child having been born, there could be no representation by
a class member in esse, and the interests of any after born
children would be adverse to those of the living beneficiaries.
The second problem was at what time should distribution
of the fund be made, in view of the apparent conflict between
the direction for payment at twenty-one and the further pro-
vision that children born at any time hereafter should be
equally entitled.
The circuit judge held that the unborn children were prop-
erly represented by a guardian ad litem and would be bound
by the decree, and that distribution of the share of each bene-
ficiary should be made when he became twenty-one. No
conflict in the directions as to time of payment was found.
This was because the provision made for children "born at
any time hereafter" was construed to be limited to children
born after the making of the will but before the death of
the testatrix. This interpretation of the phrase was com-
pelled, the circuit judge concluded, by the clearly expressed
intention that beneficiaries who were twenty-one at' the exe-
cution of the will as well as those who thereafter attained
that age either before or after the testatrix's death, should
immediately be paid their respective shares "freed and dis-
charged of all trusts." Importance also was attached to the
context (the entire sentence is quoted above) in which "born
at any time hereafter" was used. The fact that only a semi-
colon separated it from a clause dealing with the death of
a beneficiary during the testatrix's life was regarded as
further evidence that "born at any time hereafter" meant
born before the death of the testatrix.
On appeal the circuit court decree was affirmed. Consider-
ing the sufficiency of the representation of the unborn chil-
dren by a guardian ad litem, the opinion of the Supreme
Court reviews some of the many South Carolina cases, com-
mencing with Bofil v. Fisher3 and ending with Caine 'V. Grif-
fin.4 The latter case, decided in 1958, determined that repre-
sentation by a guardian ad litem is sufficient when the
interest in land of an unborn class is sought to be transferred
3. 3 Rich. Eq. 1 (1850).
4. 232 S. C. 562, 103 S. E. 2d 37 (1958).
[Vol. is360
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from the original land to another tract exchanged therefor.
The Caine case5 was regarded as controlling since, as stated
in the opinion, ".... if the title or interest of an unborn may
be ascertained and disposed of ... it logically follows that
it can be adjudicated, after due inquiry, that the unborn has
no interest ... "
In the Restatement of the Law of Property, the American
Law Institute recognizes that property interests of unborn
persons' are sufficiently represented by a guardian ad litem
appointed for that purpose pursuant to statutory authority.
However, the Institute further "... takes no position as to...
the general power of equity ... apart from statute . . ." to
authorize such a procedure.7 This position of the Institute
the Court acknowledged, but then concluded that the general
power of equity was sufficient apart from statute, citing
Caine v. Griffin.8
The Court agreed with the circuit judge's conclusion that
the provision made for children born at any time hereafter
must be limited to those born after the making of the will
but within the testatrix's lifetime, and found that such a
construction harmonized the pertinent clauses of the will.
Although the point is a close one, the interpretation is justi-
fiable as a not unreasonable application of the class gift rule
of convenience 9
If, however, the testatrix unmistakably had expressed an
intention to include children born after her death, a further
question would need to be answered, namely, to what extent
if at all could distribution be made to persons already twenty-
one years of age. Relative to this further problem the Court
stated arguendo that if after-born children were included,
... the trust fund could not be distributed, or certainly all
5. See note 4 supra.
6. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182 (1936).
7. Id. at § 182, comment e caveat.
8. See note 4 supra.
9. See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW Or PROPERTY § 20.40 et seq. (Casner
ed. 1952); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 634 et seq. (1956); RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 294, 295 (1936). Since several children were
twenty-one at the testatrix's death, it seems that the gift is governed by
the rule applicable to an immediate gift of an aggregate sum to a class.
RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra § 295, at 1592. To the effect that such a gift
to the children of A 'now born or who hereafter may be born" (or wording
of similar import) includes children born after the testator's death, see
RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra § 294 comment p. Cf. SiME, op. cit. supra
§ 636, at 74. In the instant case it is noteworthy that at the time of the
suit there were no after born claimants, nor did it appear likely that any
would thereafter be born.
1961]
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of it, until the deaths of the above named persons...", citing
Dobson v. Smith.10
The Court's reference to a partial distribution with a. por-
tion of the fund withheld to assure payment of after-born
class members finds support in a relatively early English
case." An alternative solution would be an immediate dis-
tribution of his indicated share to a beneficiary who had
attained twenty-one, conditioned upon his furnishing security
to assure the refunding of a portion of the share paid him
in the event that additional beneficiaries should later be
born.'
2
Of primary interest, however, is the dictum that all of the
fund could not be distributed until the deaths of the persons
whose after-born children would be beneficiaries of the trust.
In such a situation it has been suggested' 3 that if it can be
shown that because of the age or physical condition of the
indicated parents, they are in fact incapable of thereafter
having children (in the instant case the Record makes no
such showing), distribution of the entire fund might be made
to the living beneficiaries, subject only to the power of any
later born beneficiary to demand a redistribution from those
to whom payment was made. Although the Court cited Dob-
son v. Smith' 4 in disapproval of such a solution, an earlier
South Carolina case15 would seem thus to have handled a
10. 213 S. C. 15, 48 S. E. 2d 607 (1948), discussed note 11 infra.
11. Defflis v. Goldschmidt, 1 Mer. 417, 35 Eng. Rep. 727 (1816). Defflis
is discussed in detail in the very fine brief for appellants.
12. This was the procedure recommended by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Shull v. Johnson, 55 N. C. 208 (1855). And see the English
cases collected in 67 A. L. R. 538, 545 (1980), in which cases payment was
made to the living beneficiaries on their recognizance to refund in the event
of other children being born.
13. SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 777, at 255 (2d ed. 1956). Cf.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 274 (1936). Although there is much supporting
English authority, the majority of the American cases are opposed to such
a solution of problems involving other than tax matters. The English and
American cases are collected in Annot., 67 A. L. R. 538 (1930), S. 146
A. L. R. 794 (1943).
14. 213 S. C. 15, 48 S. E. 2d 607 (1948), wherein the Court reversed a
judgment decreeing specific performance of a sales contract of land on the
ground that a subsequent birth of children to the vendors (unmarried wo-
men aged 64, 54, and 49 years respectively) would operate by way of
executory devise to defeat the interests of the vendees.
15. Magrath v. Magrath, 184 S. C. 243, 192 S. E. 273 (1937), where in
view of the fact that the indicated parents (who also -were beneficiaries)
were unmarried women over sixty years of age, the Court permitted the
termination of a trust and the distribution of the assets despite the fact
that the interests of the living beneficiaries would be divested by the later
birth of children who should outlive their parents. The opinion implies that
the distribution decreed would not extinguish the interest of a later born
child.
4
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closely analogous situation. In view of the finding that the
testatrix did not intend to include children born after her
death, no adjustment of the correlative rights of the living
and those who might be born was necessary, however.
Woodward v. Cagte,16 a suit to construe a will, involves a
determination of the time at which a remainder in land be-
came indefeasibly vested. The testator was survived by three
sons. By paragraph five of his will he devised the land con-
cerned to his son, Alexander, "for and during the term of his
natural life and at his death to his widow for life and at
her death to his children absolutely per stirpes. In default
of such children the same shall vest in my executors to be
disposed of as provided in paragraph six." In substance,
paragraph six provided that the executors should hold other
land in trust for certain income beneficiaries until the death
of the last survivor of the testator's three sons and until
the attainment of twenty-one by the testator's youngest grand-
child, after which the executors were to sell the land and
"divide the proceeds per stirpes among the children of my
said three sons, the child or children of a deceased child to
take the parent's share."
Alexander died without ever having had a child, but was
survived by a widow. At the death of the testator's last son
there were four living grandchildren, all of whom were
twenty-one years of age. The question raised was whether
a purchaser of the interests of these four grandchildren would
acquire an indefeasible title, subject only to a life interest
in Alexander's widow. Against this construction it was ar-
gued that the testator intended the trust to continue during
the life of Alexander's widow, and that only after her death
was the land to be sold, and the proceeds divided among the
beneficiaries then in being.17
16. 235 S. C. 527, 112 S. E. 2d 480 (1960).
17. As pointed out in the circuit decree (Record, p. 43), should the latter
construction be adopted, it would seem that the limitation is an "unborn
widow" one which (insofar as a substituted gift to children of the testator's
grandchildren is provided) violates the rule against perpetuities. See
SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1228 (1956). Where a limitation
is fairly susceptible of two different constructions, one of which complies
with the rule against perpetuities while the other is violative thereof, the
well settled rule is in favor of the construction which conforms to the re-
quirements of the perpetuities rule. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPE-
TurTms § 633 (4th ed. 1942) ; SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 9 § 1288;
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 243, comment n. (1936). In the instant case,
application of this principle favors the construction adopted by thd Court.
1961]
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The Court held that the trust of the interest in remainder
terminated at the death of the survivor of the testator's three
sons, and that the four then living grandchildren (all of
whom already were twenty-one years of age) had indefeasible
interests and could convey good title to the property, subject
only to the life estate of Alexander's widow.
In Croft v. McKie 8 the will gave the entire estate of the
testator to his widow for life, and subject thereto, to each of
his seven children a tract of land for his or her "sole and
separate use." It was further provided that if any of the
children should die childless, "her or their share shall revert
to my estate for division among the survivors." Another
portion of the will provided, "It is my will and desire that
in case of the death of anyone of these my before mentioned
children without lawful issue of his or her body the bequests
herein made shall revert to my estate for division among the
survivors."
In an action to quiet title to one of the tracts it was held
that the estate given to each of the children was not a life
estate, but an, estate in fee simple defeasible on the contin-
gency of the death of such child without issue. The Court
further held that the word "survivors" did not mean those
who survived the testator, but referred to those who survived
a child dying without issue. Nor did "survivors" include the
issue of a child already dead when a devisee died without
issue. "[T]he clear intention of the testator," stated the
Court, "was that upon the death of a child without issue the
property devised to him was to be divided among his brothers
and sisters then living."
The trial judge concluded that the executory interests of
the surviving children in the tracts of those who died without
issue were nontransmissible and inalienable (Record, p. 35)
prior to the death of a child without issue. Notwithstanding
this conclusion, however, he ruled that a deed with special
warranty which the surviving children as part of a voluntary
partition had given to a child who thereafter died without
issue, would estop the grantors from claiming the tract de-
vised the deceased child, thus permitting the land to pass
under the will of the deceased child. Since certain parties
did not appeal from the circuit decree, it was unnecessary
for the Supreme Court to pass on this ruling.
18. 235 S. C. 231, 111 S. E. 2d 210 (1959).
[Vol. 13
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. In Gist v. Brown 9 the testator devised* land as follows:
I give, bequeath and devise my 'Dairy Farm' house and
buildings, and one hundred acres of land with the house,
(the land to be selected by my son, S. J. McCaughrin)
with such of the outfit on said place as I may own to.
my said son, S. J. McCaughrin, his wife, and his son,
Robert, and such other child or children as may be bornm
to the said S. J. McCaughrin, for and during the term.
of his natural life, and at his death, one-third of sai1
place to the wife of S. J. McCaughrin surviving him,.
and remaining two-thirds, to be equally divided among-
his children, the child or children of a predeceased child!
taking the share his or their parent would have taken..
The disposition of this place as above indicated is for the,
benefit of the wife and children of the said S. J. Mc-.
Caughrin, and is in no case to be subjected to his debts.
In case he should leave no wire surviving him, then the'
whole place is to be divided among his children as above
indicated."
Robert survived the testator but died intestate during the
life of his father, and the issue raised was whether Robert's
interest was transmissible to his heirs (his father and moth-
er), or whether it was nontransmissible by reason of being
contingent upon Robert's survival of his father. The Court
found nothing in the limitation which indicated an intention
to make Robert's interest nontransmissible. The opinion cites
a number of South Carolina cases, including Albergotti v.
gummers.20 The Gist case is discussed in more detail in the
review of Wills and Trusts, where consideration is given to
the Court's remarks anent Albergotti.
Dedication-Municipal Control of Dedicated Streets
In Sloan v. City o? Greenville2' the Court thus framed the
issue before it:
The question for determination upon this appeal is,
whether the City of Greenville, which holds title to the
streets -in question, in trust, for the public for street
purposes only, has authority to permit the area above
such streets to be used for private purposes.
19. 236 S. C. 31, 113'S. E. 2d 75 (1960).
20. 205 S. C. 179, 31 S. E. 2d 129 (1944).
21. 235 S. C. 277, 111 S.'E.-2d 573 (1959).
3651961]
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As applied to the facts, it was held that the defendant city
had no power to authorize the construction of a privately
owned parking garage overhanging two streets which had
been dedicated to the public for street purposes only. The
.proposed garage would have overhung the streets in question
za maximum distance of eight feet at a minimum height of
,twelve feet.
22
The dedicator of the streets had been dead for over two
'.hundred years, and suit was brought not by one claiming
-the fee through him, 23 but by a private citizen suing as a
"taxpayer, resident, and user of the streets. The act com-
plained of being an encroachment upon an interest of the
public, the City argued that plaintiff had no standing'to sue
in.the absence of an allegation of special and peculiar damage
to 4finself, different in kind and degree from that of the
public. The Court refused to consider the objection, how-
ever, on the ground that not having been raised by demurrer,
it had been waived. Thus the strength of the defense remains
to be tested in some later suit.24
The opinion in Sloan quotes Grady v. City of Greenvile
25
as follows:
If a dedication is made for a specific or defined pur-
pose, neither the Legislature, a municipality, or its suc-
cessor, nor the general public has any power to use the
property for any other purpose than the one designated,
whether such use be public or private, and whether the
dedication is a common-law or a statutory dedication,
and this rule is not affected by the fact that the changed
use may be advantageous to the public. 18 C. J. 127;
McCormac v. Evans, 107 S. C. 39, 42, 92 S. E. 19 (1917).
To the hasty reader this quotation might indicate that the
Court doubted the power of the Legislature to authorize the
22. The Record (pp. 14, 16) discloses that the overhang would extend
over the sidewalk area but not over the area for vehicular travel.
23. It appears that the fee to the streets in question was in the abutting
property owners. See Chapman v. Greenville Chamber of Commerce, 127
173, 184, 120 S. E. 548,(1923). The abutting lot on which the garage
was to be built was under lease to the persons seeking the building permit
iii issue (Record, p. 19).
24. That the defense is meritorious, see McQuIN, MuNiciPAL Cop-
P,0RATONS § 30.145 (3rd ed. 1950), and the cases there cited.
25. 129 S. C. 89, 95, 123 S. E. 495 (1924). Source of the quoted passage
is 18 C. J. 127, and the next sentence reads: "This can only be done under
the right of eminent domain." The context in Corpus Juris limits the
applicability of the quoted passage to situations where the interest of the
dedicator or his successor is asserted or that of a- property owner with
special interest, such as an abutting jot owner.
(Vol. is-
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss3/9
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
erection of the proposed building. However, a later passage
in the opinion distinguishes Chapman v. Greenville Chamber
of Commerce2 6 on the ground that the encroachment there
complained of was authorized by a legislative enactment,
while in the instant case "[t]here is no act of the Legislature
granting to the City Council of Greenville the authority to
permit the encroachments here involved." Certainly the hold-
ing and opinion in Chapman make clear that the Legislature
has power to authorize such an encroachment as against all
but the owner of the fee or other person showing an injury
to a property interestY.
2
Since the rationale of Sloan seems equally applicable to
overhanging advertising signs and marquees, further judicial
clarification- may be necessary. The case is also discussed
in the Survey of Public Corporations.
Tenancy in Common - Compensaion to Improving Tenant
Shumaker v. Shumaker,28 a partition suit, involves the
right of a tenant in common to compensation for improve-
ments made by him on the undivided premises. The facts
were that the cotenants in remainder had joined in a sale
of the timber on the land to raise funds for the repair of
a dwelling thereon which was occupied by their mother, the
life tenant. When the funds so raised proved insufficient (it
was necessary to tear down the dwelling and Xrebuild), the
one cotenant Who resided with the life tenant, without the
consent of his cotenants but to the knowledge of some of
them, used his own money and furnished his labor to com-
plete the project. When sued in partition by his cotenants
after the death of the life tenant, the improving tenant
sought reimbursement for the sums advanced by him and
for the value of his labor.
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit decree, which had
found the improving tenant to be entitled to share in any
enhanced value of the land which was attributable to the
dwelling, in the proportion that his contribution bore to the
entire cost of construction, but not to exceed the sum of his
contributions of money and labor.29 The opinion is a common
26. 127 S. C. 173, 120 S. E. 548 (1923).
27. See 127 S. C. 173, 180, 184, 120 S. E. 584 (1923).
28. 234 S. C. 421, 108 S. E. 2d 682 (1959).
29. The rule as usually stated is that the measure of compensation to
the improving tenant is the amount by which the improvement has en.
hanced the value of the land. Among other cases, see Buck v. Martin, 21
1961"1
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sense one which does much to clarify the South Carolina
rule in the area of law in question.30 Also to be noted is the
somewhat unusual factual situation in that the improvements
were made by a cotenant in remainder rather than a co-
tenant of the present freehold.
Vendor and Purchaser
In Douglass v. Threadgill3' the purchaser of land had ac-
cepted a deed subject by its terms to a recorded easement
of way across the conveyed land. Thereafter he sued the
seller for breach of the sales contract, which had provided
for a conveyance free from encumbrance. In his answer the
seller alleged that plaintiff having accepted the deed with
actual, constructive and imputed knowledge of the existence
of the easement, he was now estopped to maintain the action.
The evidence established that prior to his purchase plaintiff
knew that persons were driving across the land, but believed
their use was permissive only, he having been so informed
by the real estate broker of the defendant. Prior to consum-
mation of the sale the attorney who examined title for the
purchaser (and who also drew the deed for the seller) men-
tioned to the purchaser the existence of the way, but did not
explain its legal significance.
On appeal a verdict for plaintiff was set aside and a new
trial ordered on the ground that the pleadings and evidence
made a jury issue as to whether plaintiff had accepted the
deed with knowledge of the existence of the driveway and
of defendant's inability to conveyfree of such easement. If
so, said the Court, plaintiff would be estopped to maintain
the action.
The trial judge had refused to consider defendant's con-
tention that the terms of the contract of sale had been merged
S. C. 590, 53 Am. Rep. 702 (1884). And see 14 AM. JuR. Cotenancy, § 49,
at 117 (1938), which is quoted by the court.. The further qualification that
the compensation is not to exceed the cost of the improvement is in the
circuit decree (p. 55 of the Record), though not mentioned in the opinion
of the Supreme Court. Obviously the qualified rule will result in a smaller.
compensation than that otherwise obtainable in a case where the "enhance-
ment in value exceeds the cost of the improvement. If reimbursement is
limited to less than the value of the improvement, it would seem that
interest should be allowed the improving tenant. Consider White v. Smith,
70 N. J. Eq. 418, 62 Atl. 560 (1906). But cf. Talbot v. Todd, 7 J. J. Marsh
456 (Ky. 1832).
30. See note 11 S. C. L. Q. 520,'*521 (1959) for a discussion of earlier
South Carolina cases.
31. 235 S. C. 110, 110 S. E. 2d 169 (1959).
[Vol. is
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in the subsequent deed, on the ground that the matter had
not been pleaded. Without commenting on the merits of
the defense, the court stated that since there must be a new
trial, the defendant by amendment could remove any doubt
as to the sufficiency of its pleading.
Miscellaneous
Smith v. DuRant,32 a boundary dispute case, raises ques-
tions as to the admissibility of evidence and the effect of
a prior action as an estoppel by judgment. These matters
are more appropriately treated in other Survey articles. The
Court recognized the general rule that when construing a
description in a deed, ordinarily the calls for boundaries will
control in case such calls are in conflict with the calls for
distances. However, under the facts presented the ordinary
rule was found not to be controlling. Nor did the facts relied
on by the defendant establish an estoppel of the plaintiff
to assert her legal title to the land in dispute.
Ga~llnt v. Todd 3 considers the effect of a written instru-
ment entered into between a landowner and a firm of real
estate brokers. The Court concluded that the instrument was
a mere brokerage contract of employment which did not
confer upon the brokers power to execute a contract of sale
enforceable by a purchaser against the owner. The case is
more fully discussed in the surveys of Agency and of Con-
tracts.
Legislation
An Act 34 approved May 24, 1960, provides a method where-
by a person owning land on which is situated an abandoned
cemetery or burying ground may secure the removal of the
graves if, in the opinion of the governing body of the county
or municipality in which the land is situated, such removal
is necessary and expedient. For purposes of the Act, a con-
veyance of the land without reservation of the cemetery or
burial ground is made evidence of abandonment.35
32. 236 S. C. 80, 113 S. E. 2d 349 (1960).
33. 235 S. C. 428, 111 S. E. 2d 779 (1960).
34. Act No. 805 (1960).
35. Prior to the statute, only a removal of the remains would constitute
an abandonment of a burying place. Frost v. Columbia Clay Co., 130 S. C.
72, 124 S. E. 767 (1925).
1961]
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